

Early 60: Many unflights

U-2: Oct 60

13 July: Summary of reasons, by 24 to OSD; summary of other complaints

14 July: OSD: Special Group decision to reduce somewhat the frequency of the U-2 unflight program [1-2 a month] for some reasons [?] and review of peripheral reasons with view to reducing this frequency. MCN + G should be informed of reasons for continuing those at current rate.

[requested by CANT: COMOR requested + get approval for 2 Jan 62
unflights/month starting Feb 62.]

Time from touchdown to initial PI Report by NPIC: 22-25 hrs.
Though principal objections are CANT's, there are also

Current

No interplay
EO:

1. Research: a) Compartmentation: CIA, NSA, J-3, JCCRG, State

b) Channels ~~Channel~~ JCCRG, State, J-3

c) No comparison of crises.

d) Few studies.

Issues: What sorts of info; why needed; means of getting

info, costs; preoccupations of high-level, discussion

of problems found but in choices relating to these

matters; impact of estimates, incidents, on further

reason; conscious "dialog" with laws;

Timing, since nature of crisis critically affected by

timing of info flow — as distinct from flow of

expressing decisions, estimates and actions — and that

dependent on the influences affecting reason & intell,

including existing actions (incidents, protests, assassinations,

disclosures/leakage/deception). Effects: public pressure

Also predictions & commitments, decisions on reason, contingency

planning, mental preparation, relation to political context

[Suppose the had discovered UK plan 6 weeks before
action, instead of 1 week?]

Johnson ^{say to} ~~waited~~ "after US elections"

radio for
Tanks not ready for US reaction to ~~shuttle down~~; shuttle down might be

easy reaction to rebel raid, which Cuba says is reconnoitered by planes

North VN prepares to ~~shuttle down~~ AA

US gets 24 SAM.

Low orders to start recon. 200-55/mo

2 planes controller hears ~~big~~ fighter command "Are your weapons

orders short; no sleep; other ~~loss~~ ^{loss} ~~unit~~, radio failure; ~~later~~, ~~some~~

controllers on ground interpret order, "Maintain assigned altitude."

Cuba: 457 high, 8 low in 63

By mid-60,

USAF Historical Div

Studies of Air Ops in International Incidents - Crisis

- 1) Lebanon Crisis 1958 (S) (Bunch, Little)
- 2) Taiwan Straits Crisis 1958 (S) Van Stammers

Chronology & Documentation of Air Force Actions During
the Cuban Crisis: 14 Oct - 23 Nov 62. TS 120 pp

for SecAF Angell, Kilduff, Berger

250 pp. version of above. est. completion 15 March 63

Summary & Assessment of AF actions during Cuban Crisis

40 pp. for C/S. First version published 2 Dec 62

Rosenberg, Van Stammers

consider might sorties at two. level.

Feb 22, 61 JFL-K

In addition, I believe we should make more use of diplomatic channels for just informal discussion of these questions, not in the sense of negotiations (since I am sure that we both recognize the interests of other countries are deeply involved in these issues), but rather as a mechanism of communication which should, insofar as is possible, help to eliminate misunderstandings and unnecessary divergences, however great the basic differences may be.

I hope it will be possible, before too long, for us to meet personally for an informal exchange of views regarding to some of these matters.

(Announced May 12, after Cuban exchange of letters & talks with
Thompson; accepts US proposed date of June 2-4 for talks)
Laos, disarm, Berlin (no hint of hard line).

(now filed)

Feb 15, 62 (Conf to Dec 31) L letter, and message through GSR
JCR to K (and Jan 30 talk with Arghubee) (in addition to Nov 17)

... further pressure on the West in Berlin only
increases the pressure with France & the Fed Rep to
build a greater military force, to secure an independent
national capability and to adopt a more rigid attitude on
any accommodation.

... I have written frankly of these matters to you because
in the hope that you will respond in kind. I can assure
you that I will continue to hold in the utmost secrecy
any message or proposal sent through this channel, for I
have always regarded it as a private and confidential
means of communication, without all of the pressures which
public communications bring to any question of this kind.

I realize that such an exchange, if successful, would
represent a considerable departure from normal diplomacy
[? etc?] But, surely we both recognize that our
situation requires new methods of procedure.

How unusual is demand? What are efforts?

Did it suggest to K, JFK willingness & ability to keep secret?

June 5, 62 JFK (refers to K's talks with Salinger)

I am glad to learn again from Mr. Salinger that

Ans. DeLoach has your confidence in unusual measure

[I am under decision made to

tell JFK after election.]

March 10, 62 (copy to Feb 15 JFK-K and USG mem of March 10
K to JFK)

... I would not like to leave anything unclear on one
way or another we will sign a Geneva peace treaty

I have already said at Geneva and repeat it now that

if there is no other choice we will make use of the US

sample and the lesson what was taught us by it in fact

some late-1960s occupying official positions in the CIA

22 May Roca told Western diplomat (?) 11 May idea
had no definite plans for a drive at the UN
against the overflight. Roca did not appear worried
over a serious incident developing (apparently
about the possibility -). Said he personally believed
that after the November elections the US might
become convinced that there was no strategic
missile threat on the island, and that O-2
recon was therefore not necessary.

[Who? See exact wording.]

Shah will not stand for reelection. Open war could lead again
to struggle like civil war.

England in "colonial campaign," in face of general elections.

calling for US invasion

The Special Group (Argentina) as of 27 Aug: Pratt, McN,

OSK, McG, Helfetree, Taylor, Kennedy, Kansake:

(Johnson?)

16 Jan 2012
Talk to Patterson, Andrew Vinn Chavillon.

Changed US intends to blockade; this would be an act of war; Sov vessels have orders to proceed even if fired on by US warships; SV would use submarines & rockets to enforce right of passage. But K believed there would be no war over Cuba.

["Strange" fear of US blockade.]

17-28's in Checklist, 11 Oct. Nothing on missiles.

29 Aug? JFK: "not at this time."

30 Aug: Khrushchev discusses fear of blockade.

31 Aug: Radio Moscow on JFK press conf ignored JFK

application of remark on Cuba; said "The USSR is far

from delighted at what is going on in neighboring

Turkey & Iran," where US bases represent "a direct

threat to the security of the USSR."

1 Sept NPT calls for calm US response; denies there were 20

NR, 13 Sept

11 Sept TASS statement: By replying that the Berlin negotiations can await the completion of the fall elections in the US, the Sovs have recognized the hiatus in negotiations and have sought to place this problem in the background (for the time being) probably in the belief that this would temper what they might consider to be planned US actions against Cuba.

- [Suppose DeBorja, Gromyko, etc. talking of Cuba + Berlin meant: 1) If you don't answer miraculously, we'll keep quiet on Berlin — till after elections.
- 2) If you do cause a Cuban crisis, we'll give you a Berlin crisis too — before elections.
- 3) Whenever you give us trouble on Cuba, we'll hang up Berlin.]

How does intell. comm — other than Portland — view the
statements of Sows privately to officials as intelligence?

Did they know at time? How would these have affected
their estimates?

Why did SA analysts come to interpret DIA's instruction in
May '62 and mid-Aug to check out with NPIC any report
susceptible to photo verification as a restriction against
publishing anything (was in Pres ^{not subject to explicit ban} Checklist) that was susceptible
of photo verification and had not (yet) been verified.

(even though no flights between 5-27 Aug). [Effect: no
items or offensive remarks even in Checklist, even after Sept 20;
general limitation, during SAM buildup.] [not intended to
limit publication.]

To what extent was Pres & McG & Sec State informed
of reports after 15 Sept, not published? (McG & Sec
informed by DIA).

522-9900 Mrs. Connell - telephone

K letters

1. What was effort of showing letters to de G, Mac?
Have others seen others?
2. What was specific reference to including use of channels?

What is role of current intelligence bulletins? O/B
"publishing"? Who does this educate?

role of UThant Oct 24-25, 28-30

Burbanest

Timber - Cuba

International Context and Behavioral Science
Roger Fisher

Basic Books NY 1984

Δ Δ

Tinkins Arb right after crisis: "K" was damaged
by the picture of disarray in 1960

7

4

Summit Conference of 1955 and the arms deal

Churchill-Bell 10/24/62 9:40

C: Adlai is kicking like a stein over this statement.

... He wants to indicate some softening of our position.

(Letter to W.P. C. Thant)

Pres-Bell 10/24 10:45

... (on letter:) It seems to me that this record will be published.

my two letters to him and his two to me.

10/24/62 3:25 pm Bundy - Ball: Jk 6 next

interesting ships have turned back. Starting a study session.

Bundy & Ball only 2 told so far.

Chubb - Ball 5:20 10/24/62 Congress getting impression invasion

imminent. Ball: No. ^{So} Operation more political than military.

If want to see what can be done on a political level,

first as we do.

(Brandon had just been in Cuba).

10/24/62: Bundy - Ball 8:05, 8:25

(Pant was anti-tanker interception. McN wants to intercept
tanker & to turn him back; Ball wants; Bundy?

Basic orders to Navy: not enforcing "non-discriminatory blockade,"
take anything that comes, but: a blockade with instructions from McN
as to which ship to enforce it on.

(That evening, Pres gave Congress impression we were not going to stop
tankers. "Mean" so POL blockade, but ships might be overhauled.

are threatening us with various misfortunes, but I
think they are more clever in their things than in the
words because only assassins can sow threaten with
war but assassins are always mean people. I, for
myself, consider that our counterparts with whom we
conduct conversation are mentally normal people and
can realistically evaluate and understand what it
would mean to attack the USSR or another country.

... I believe that we, the men treated with great
trust and responsibility by our peoples, should understand
all this correctly and should oppose opinions which
sometimes push us to go the wrong way. To say it
straightly; it is not frightening each other with words.
We have seen enough of frightening. You, Mr. Pres., participated!
in WW II, ~~and~~ I participated not only in that war.
Both of us are aware what war means and as the leaders
of states we know what military means as now at the

disposal of the USSR & the USA. Let us not count
by pieces who has more or who has fewer modern
means of mass destruction. Each of our countries has
already stock-piled more than enough means to
inflict an irrefragable devastating blow.

The SU intends to conclude a German peace treaty

... (refers to VPK action of international organ on way
to Berlin, raised by Adyphatze from 30).

... possible only on condition that

troops now stationed there are withdrawn; and allow
symbolic contingents of USSR neutral troops for 3-5 years.

(refers to someone's confidential conversation with B.L.K.
in effort to
since no progress on Berlin, VPK considers it necessary to find
the way wherein the nearest achievement of an agreement with
the SU is possible; this achievement is real, & part of all
the test was; said that VPK would like to have a summit meeting
it always willing.]

Bob will soon arrive. He enjoys the full confidence
of the SG and my full confidence. Whenever you need
to convey something to me in a confidential way he will
be able to transmit this to me personally.

(earlier) Our proposal is a concession to you. We do not
want to create difficulties for you, Mr. Pires, and your
country because in your country there are hot-heads, may be.
There are some among you who are too. These questions are
currently understood in our country and by our allies.

[and negotiation; I could have
blackmailed JFK with this, with all this.]

Sept 4, 62 Informal Comm from JFK - JFK.

(re JFK-Mac statement of Aug 27)

It was immediately agreed on agreement on the
cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and
under water but at the same time let us agree that
w.r.t. underground tests negotiations will go on with me
to reach an agreement on the underground tests as well.

.... (suggests noatorium during negotiations.)

Sept 28, 62 Ltr to JFK re Nuclear Testing (in WH)
+ Cuba

Oct 3, 62 JFK - K

I am giving careful consideration to your communication
of Sept 28, and I am glad that we can continue
to use this channel as a means of communicating privately and
freely.

I shall want to comment separately on other aspects
of your letter, but because of the limited discussion in
the UN I want you to have my views promptly on the
subject of nuclear testing. I believe we are nearer to
agreement on this issue than on others, and I believe that
we should keep at it to see if we cannot promptly
reach the understanding which the world wants & needs.

Ref. to K's ref to recent Pugwash conf, which however
you suggest that the agreement we can now
promptly reach on cessation of tests in the atmosphere,
in outer space or under water be accompanied by a
5 year moratorium on underground explosions. But
surely it will not take 5 years to reach agreement — if agreement
is even to be reached — on banning underground tests.
... (reasonable, other treaty) ...

So I continue to think that we are within striking
distance of a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer

... from and under water. I believe we should try to
work out such an agreement in time to meet the
target day of Jan 1, 1963.

... trouble, negotiate or underground tests. To agree on

the modest number of on-site inspections necessary to

supplement black boxes. ^{Dec 19} Later K proposed 2-3; we

proposed 8; K said none, because not needed and

blows down for big inspectors, covering 500 sqm each, flying

being, not only "symbolic" investigations would be splashed by

spies.)

Dec 28, 62 JFK-K (public) refers to K-VFK Dec 19.

W.r.t. number of on-site inspections, appears to have been

some misunderstanding. Your impression seems to be that

And. Dean told Kerguelen ^(allegedly on Oct 30, in NY) that the US might be prepared

to accept an annual number of on-site inspections between 2 & 4.

And Dean advised me that the only number which he

mentioned in his discussions with Krg. was between 8 & 10.

W.H.H.

status of "trust" - loss.

Look of moon on 30-31 ~~Oct~~ Oct

outer canvas cover wound on ships, but not inner
covering, apparently a rubber jacket.

No high search on 1-2 Nov? (mines might have
been redeployed?)

[Suppose we want to establish inspection agreement
fast in crisis: plans, preparations, UN.

In Cuba, did have only on Cuban intrusiveness to forestall.
Did they move out fast to frustrate?

[Effects of alert on "incidents": Cubans shot down
two of their ^{own} liaison planes during May alert, 1964.

What "disturbances" may be destabilizing (a) lead
to ~~deliberate~~ active consideration of response; b) lead to
action; lead to alarming signals to opponents.]

[Needs of state as "partners" vis-à-vis w.r.t. each other's
publics; often explicit conversation; each recognizes
other's need to deceive public & allies, each relies on
↑ other to maintain certain secrets, may help other in needs
deceptions, secrets; holds other's secrets; ^{May be secret} ~~deceptions~~ or deceptions
Analogies? Cops & robbers? Symbiotic relationship? ...

strategic reserves of POC were stored on island to
accommodate military equipment; one area seen on 11 Nov 4.7.

(Not seen before? Would this have frustrated blockade?)

Prob C-C birds: appeared in House 23 Oct, Scrabble 23 Oct.

First info on use of deception by Sovs: 13 Nov. during "8
run on airfields (without cockpit). One during still being
assembled.

42 4/5-2/3 seen on 16 Dec; w/ 37 seen earlier (17 Oct),
most certain all there by 17 Oct; where had the other 3
been?

Benedict's encampment discovered 25 Oct. By 14 Nov, all of
4 regiments around that force: well over 4000 Troops.

Earlier est: about 1200 (4 reg brns).

All established since July. (?)

Each group at least 1000-1500, perhaps 2500

i.e. Total: 4000-10,000.

was it necessary to determine types of equipment, count.

Constructing 10,000 ft. runway, underground storage & hangars at air-
porting. I was planned to have USA Bombers and to let
the news there. [Subsonic...]

At least one ship with II-28's was missed.

Discovery of II-28 crates was stimulus for recon mission of
14 & 15 Oct?

8 Oct: unconfirmed reports of II-28 crates arriving, without

Est. of photos of 28 Sept published 10 Oct.

Cruise missile: spotted 29 Aug; reported as probable cruise
missile, 7 Sept; confirmed 17 Sept.

Deployment might continue, to fill gaps.

Komarov first arrived 14 Aug.

1416-21 first seen 5 Sept. First SI indication 13 Oct.

Anti-air missiles first seen 5 Nov.

How much time had Adm/jntll figured would
be available between time missiles might be identified
and time they could be fired?

7 ships contacted by Moscow in individual cipher messages,
6 hours after Pres. speech. Tunnel beat.

Encl in Cuba 7-8 Sept; Oncoming 29 Aug, 8-10 Oct.

[Possible lie by K that mcs were in Cuba, so as
to reassure US that he had removed them (K to Ambr.
Rebets, 12 Nov. ')]

5 ships WAS THIS USED ON SHIPS TO CUBA? (tanker?)
increasing of "hall effect": increase in readings of neutron
flux in mirrors of hull of a ship. Neutron detectors.

(not high reading, from land). (False alarm possible?)

(New effect; not completely understood).
undermined operators; rainstorm, high voltage;

[Suppose JFK had to justify action to public, then —
without releasing photos? Was there might he have
thought JFK would be reluctant to release? Was he?
Might he have been?]]

No high flights suitable for search after 28 Oct? between 22-28
(No, no new sites detected. Warheads; IRBMs.)

33 MRBMs identified by 4 Nov; on 4 Nov, Kuznetsov
sentinal 41 to McCloy.

Thought possible at time that a few IRBMs did arrive
and remained undetected; but none seen leaving, whereas many
MRBMs were detected detected; assumed, therefore, that no IRBMs
SA-2 33 7 ft x 2 had been brought. Even if IRBMs hidden,
SS-3 Rhyton 54' ^{was assumed} sites take a long time to construct,
SS-4 Samal 65' ^{was assumed: 15'} could be detected.

[Consider political implications of 'evidence' that missiles
had remained in Cuba! McN's hostages.]

R-JFK, Nov 5 (given by D to RKK)

(Missing: exchange of Nov 62; Dec 62)

R-JFK on me tests, Dec 19, 62 (received 1/20/63)

Other 3

Pres report about Roberts story 11/15. Dat.

Dick Davis, EUR

12/14/62 4:45 Deb needs Pres reply to K

Deb wants to know how private TV fellow was, and
for private channel

Bill: we don't know if that was done with his approval.

he might not even know it.

(Deb connected this with "dangerously misleading info.")

Return to Pres, Dec ²⁹ 1962

5th and 6th from Turkey presented

McC before Madson Comm Feb 5 63

Chine: C.A. official position is always the agreed intell est.
published in bull. --

worked out with other intell agencies. When I advise McC.

of what our own analysts' view is, we sometimes advise

him that we think the official ests are on the low or high

side. as his report to Pres in August indicated, we

were advising him throughout that period that we

thought the official ests were considerably in error on

the low side, that in time we would gather intell which

would prove that the figures were larger.

our unofficial, in-house view.

McC. I said yesterday it is our judgment, ^{now} that the first
offensive missiles arrived in Cuba about Sept 8, and the reports

on those we received ^(in Wash) about Sept 21st. Those reports were

refugee & agent reports and had to be verified. The

orders went out for the flight to verify them on Oct 4, but

weather intervened & we were not able to (till Oct 14).

Effect of Secrecy: "Finding out" is postponed for both sides till just before
until action. e.g. Actor doesn't learn, from responses to his explorations, moderately, but
1) reaction to his actions will be. Shylock.

[Consider general effects of discovering sooner;
i.e., imagining / gaming / planning sooner?

Effects of gaming in reducing surprise? All good?

(or, do they reduce chance of ever taking violent
action; as well as chance of paralysis? Balance?)

2) Hypothetical experiment: Shift the info flows
and planning flows relative to the
underlying event / energy action / decision flows.

Any situation in which action ~~is~~ immediately
^{is planned, prepared}
must be considered to prevent possible major loss
arises, the question: Why wasn't action taken
already? Why is need seen just now, on such a
short deadline? (The question assumes that
the flow of events creating the problem, the challenge to
action, ^{was} not "in fact" discontinuous, though our
knowledge or awareness of this or other implications might be;
Was there not early "indication" of this need

(Crisis: an urgent "problem", not merely an urgent need to act, to select (~~with~~ the one obviously appropriate act).)

Problem: Since is difficult, non-obvious; in fact, it is alternatives, goals, relevant contingencies, etc. must be defined; search & invention, calculation & evaluation are needed.

Crisis: a "problem" with a ^{short} deadline.

Can be graded in terms of importance (gravity, goals, risks involved); difficulty; novelty;

Crisis to expect in pattern of post):

1) U-2's against SAMs (whole issue of deciding whether to send them. How much has/will China even change this "dialog"? How similar is current debate?

Note switch on use of drones.

2) Recon vs. protests and threats.

|| 3) Appearance of ~~SA-2s~~ SA-2s in North Vietnam

[As in Pearl Harbor: available info fell into a coherent pattern, ^{and on} which was exactly in line with one of the major hypotheses predicted earlier (and in Cuba, practical reality) = ~~Data~~

X = true hyp (low initial prob); Y = favorite Z = other

Given data (which does not support X but doesn't strongly disprove it), prob(Z) goes down almost to 0, prob(Y) goes up almost to 1 [subject only to reversal of enemy decisions/actions]. prob(X) goes down slightly relative to prob(Y) : so former relationship of X to Y is preserved (say, 10:1)

(If they had

say; Cuba;

But if lack of positive evidence for X (vs. Y) is taken as highly significant (e.g. coverage is overestimated; enemy coverage underestimated; enemy deception underestimated; enemy lead time to move from Y to X overestimated; or X and Y regarded as exhaustive or competitive) then ^{prob X} ~~prob Y~~ goes down steadily: prob X may even decline.

Mr. Tidwell : CIA member of COMOR.

Brig Gen Craig } J-3 Caribbean Security Group (CSG)
Col. John Wright }

Cpls. Cole, Hill, Capt Thompson: DIA XX

McNaughton

[Doesn't timidity in face of Cuban SA-2s encourage spread of SA-2's?]

Burkhead - Vogt

[Problem with V-3 studies: underclassified? series of research (see memo to OSD on pass?)]

[New insiders' "experience"/education/cultural background is guaranteed to differ from old insiders']

Anticipation

Breaks in pattern

Going commt at end-August: military buildup and
extraordinary low bloc econ commitments amount to the most
extensive campaign to bolster a non-bloc country ever
undertaken by USSR."

~~Before~~ "Such an

On Feb 6, Ball accused by ~~report~~ of having ~~underestimated~~

to ~~Walter~~ ~~Comm~~ on Oct 3, extent of info of "evidence"

^{up to the time}
p. 894: "We have no evidence that there are any SSA:

in Cuba capable of firing to a greater range" (than 30 miles)

[Ball's statement prepared by Salomon, checked by McN
by teletype, on basis of C/B and D/S]

McN: Ball said, "by implication" he did not have
evidence ... a fair statement at the time.

McN: agent report was important not because, by itself, it
gave great evidence that there were ballistic missiles, but

Ford: strange that second highest officer in State
would not know; serious that he should understate
irresponsible, shameful (McN's language about Congress)

On Sept 28, Bill Bradley said to Nelson Conn. Q: "Does the
military have any intell. indicating the existence of nuclear
ball miss. in Cuba?" "No sir, it does not."

Connell: 2 agent reports. One signif. because it enabled us
to pinpoint the location involved.

One more signif. than others a refugee report.

3 SAMs in Pinar del Rio that did not seem to make any sense
in relation to a particular military location install. Elsewhere,
a logical relation.

McN: largely through analysis that this suspicion arose.

It was not based on a report that the suspicion

arose [i.e. a piece confirming hypothesis]. He

had had thousands of reports like this. (?)

What gradually formed in his mind was a hypothesis
based on the integration of 3 or 4 pieces of evidence (one
photo analysis of SAM sites)

... a hypothesis that had been formulated previously
and had been tested previously and found to be in error
in respect to other locations. His only action here
quite properly... was to test that hypo.

Sec Ball neither had nor had any reason to know of
this info. Connally: he did not... Sec State did

not. Certainly did not have benefit of the rationalization
we were undergoing, because we wanted to put it to the test
to determine whether we had anything adequately substantive
to report.

^{translation}
McN: All of the suspicions of our intell. analysts are not
submitted to me, for example daily. I have a hand rough

the ready the intell. reports that do come up ... would
have been inappropriate to distribute all these suspicions

I feel strongly that there was no reason why (Call)
should have known at that time of this kind of suspicion.
There are hundreds of suspicions of this kind today in
some areas of the world that are very important to us.
99% of the suspicions prove wrong.

Ford — But they were suggestive enough...
MCH... to designate the suspect area for the next
(?) U-2 reconnaissance.

[i.e. because specific location designated, possible to
make a very small adjustment in US actions: affecting track
of flight scheduled for other purpose. This did not reveal
much weight given to evidence. Why gave it weight?]

Appearances: Aug, none

Sept 5: Sec State: first FR + AS Com Exe Comm

Sept 12: Martin Com on FR

Sec State JFA + AS

Sept 14: Sec State Com on FA

Sept 17 " Com on FR + Com on AS

Oct 3 Ball Export Control

Nov 11, 14, 17, 25, 28 Sec State

Feb 7: Koller, Com on FA

[Hilman vs Keating's blockade, Fayall proposes:

Danger of trying ineffective policy; likelihood that
measures ineffective unless credible threat of force.

See Feb 7 63, Stennis: McC Test.

Frank Owens on Armed Services Comm, & CIA sub com
for 31 63 gathering & eval. of info by intell comm either grossly
inefficient, dangerously inadequate, or both.

McC Test. before McN intell briefing led to then writing
to McN with criticism (Saltzman) ... on his confidence.

McC: I had no doubt that Sov main base would & could serve
as sub strategic base: existence of such a base would be highly
desirable.

U-2 shootdown, April 63

SOSS/State

Exploitation of contingencies only politically possible
means for taking action steps to apply US power to reduce
Castro power & ~~perhaps~~ influence. Political & power realities,
including USSR ability to ~~anticipate~~ react in Berlin or
elsewhere, preclude arbitrary and unilateral action,
without provocation, to eliminate Castro.

USSR would be most likely to ^{official} ~~warn~~ first. Unwarranted attack
might be feature of control; provide for a minimum response,
officially; hold Castro responsible, initially

[USS objected to above?]

When I left for Office, I had been greatly concerned by helms
indications (?) that USSR was introducing offensive weapons (I-155?) into
Cuba, I had tried to warn him that unless this situation was quickly reversed
there would be no alternative but to take the harshest kind of response.
Now 15 Bowles - Debyer memo (15th).

Bowles added it was my assumption that the Ans had
not personally known that offensive weapons were being
placed there; he seemed pleased to be the bit off the
hook.

[Even without being asked by K, Debyer must
have been sending warnings based on private conversation;
though, if K thought Adams already knew ... e.g. by Oct 13
Bowles - Debyer talk...]

Bowles: basic situation could only be compared to a US
military pact with Finland, followed by an attempt by us
to line the Finnish-Sov border with missiles aimed at Sov
cities. In such circumstances I was sure that the Sov
reaction would not differ greatly from our own.

[Would Sov intell predict or discover this?]
What Sov intell failures could we predict?

Whitman: C/A roll: counterweight to intell. comm.

Stevenson (proposed?) letter to K on Wednesday (?):

Please understand Mr. Chairman that we are prepared to discuss the bases in the context of the general disarmament treaty. This we have been committed to for four years. --"

I tried to make clear I was in favor of using the phrase keeping marching.

Ball
[Ball, Helphatius, Johnson deliberately (?) left off Earlhalt - deep list of Explanations]. (11 men on "coordinating committee") purge Stevenson

[Rutge? Johnson? Brown Smith?]

On Saturday (?) and Oval Room: solemn agreement that nobody there would ever disclose the views of anybody else or his own.

Futelly: proposed head of article: 5 warmongers who in disagreement with the Pres. wanted to invade & misrule

Ball: ^{also} story story as though the real bases were the guys who were plain off base.

24 Oct. ^{Widen} Cleveland: recommends encouraging broadening
of discussion to include Turkish & Italian base problems

Sec: NO

Resolution might be put forward by Irish and/or other
approp. nationals:

"Defanging Resolution":

Security Council: noting

Requests the nuclear powers: a. to halt the delivery of
of further long range nuclear delivery vehicles (including
MRBM, IRBM, ICBM) to foreign states outside the territory of
the nuclear powers

b. to under inoperable all such weapons already located
in such foreign states, and

c. to arrange by agreement among them to remove such
weapons from the territories of such foreign states at the
earliest possible time.

Restow: Missiles - Cuba fell in category of "unusual" low actions -
with higher degree of risk. Other "unusual" actions which

intell comm had failed to predict: 2) phase of low warrent
after war (?); 3) attack on South Korea; 4) development
of 100 MT bomb. [renewal of testing?]

1) In case of Korea + Cuba, Moscow had also failed
to predict our reaction [Was our reaction "unusual"?]

2) Certain possible "unusual" actions had not materialized:
e.g. full-scale exploitation of the ICBM potential.

(Unusual? We did predict -)

Cuba: prior predictions, testing opportunity \rightarrow "wildly thing?"

See New York 1453 of Oct 24, our 1085 of Oct 25,

Djakarta 742 of Oct 25.

McC I ~~refer~~ myself had the same concern that Keating did
and expressed it long before he did and before my
departure on Aug 23 I repeatedly expressed concern but I
had no hand intell to support it.

Admission on agent reports... & indulging it was a
philosophy which I have expressed that our people felt that
the Sars would not move into a confrontation of the type they did

Suttonhall talked to Carter on Oct 12 on Keating charges.

9:15
Singles to Sec's Staff meeting Oct 3, 1963, morning of testimony Briefed
C-4 item distributed day before now considered signed by intell comm.

On 19 Sept large intercontinental rockets, more than
20 meters long, were unloaded in Meriel, near the Rio Province.
The rockets were on large trailers which they were unloaded from
the ship.

Headquarters Comments: It is more likely that source observed

SA-2 missiles being offloaded.

Brent, Toddhunter

March 6 67 Press Conf.

Q. among claims ... is that your CI chief, MC actually
knew before Oct 14 that the Sows had planted offensive
missiles in Cuba.

[Most significant evidence to Sowers was lack of more evidence

[Analyze a) Intell comm eval. of evidence

b) expectation of warning, time of install.,

adequacy of coverage, Saw secrecy

(Was Saw "disruption" important to intell. comm?)

Did they know?)

c) Intell comm prior probes

d) basis for:

1) non flights, targeting

2) dissem in intell comm

3) Pres public statements

4) queries, private statements to Sows

5 June 64

CA / Sov. world would not regard US demand for
return of all Sov military specialists as excessive or
vindictive. (Note to officers) This would render SAMs &
cruise missiles inoperable (no training of Cubans), &
some of KOMARs & MIG-21s.

[We didn't realize the size of Sov forces]